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Employment Discrimination
by Peter Reed Corbin*
and John E. Duvall**
After last year's blockbuster year, the United States Supreme Court
was relatively quiet in the area of employment discrimination during the
2012 survey period.1 The High Court's most significant ruling was its
decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.

EEOC,2 in which the Court held that the First Amendment's3 Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses create a "ministerial exception" that
barred a disability discrimination lawsuit against a religious organization.4
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
offset the Supreme Court's inactivity by handing down six published
Title VII opinions and ten published decisions in the employment
discrimination area overall (the highest number in recent years).
Perhaps the most noteworthy of these was the decision in Gowski v.

* Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University of
Virginia (B.A., 1970); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cur laude,
1975). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cur
laude, 1985). Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during 2012. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are
included: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983
(2006); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010); and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). For analysis of Eleventh Circuit employment
discrimination law during the prior survey period, see Peter Reed Corbin & John E.Duvall,
Employment Discrimination,Eleventh Circuit Survey, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1203 (2012).
2. 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Hosanna-Tabor,132 S.Ct. at 706.
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Peake,5 in which the court of appeals recognized for the first time a
retaliatory hostile work environment claim.6 The court also continued
its recent trend of handing down a huge number of unpublished
decisions, most often affirming a summary judgment for the employer.
A select few of the more significant unpublished decisions have been
reported on below.
I.

A.

TITLE VII OF THE CIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

1. Pregnancy Discrimination. Becoming pregnant out of wedlock
did not work out so well for the plaintiff in Hamilton v. Southland
Christian School, Inc.7 The plaintiff worked as a teacher for a small
Christian school. She and her fianc6 conceived a child and married a
month later. Several months after, in the midst of a meeting for the
purpose of requesting maternity leave, the plaintiff admitted that she
had conceived the child before she was married. The school responded
by firing the plaintiff for the "sin" of engaging in premarital sex.' The
plaintiff fied suit pursuant to Title VII 9 alleging that she had been
discriminated against because of her pregnancy i The district court
granted summary judgment for the school because the plaintiff could not
produce evidence of "a nonpregnant comparator who was treated
differently.""
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court.12 Citing
its prior decision in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.," discussed in the
2012 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 4 the court of appeals distinguished
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 5 and held that there was "more
than one way to show discriminatory intent" than the indirect model of
proof.'" "Another way," according to the court, was to present "circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer's

5. 682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2012).
6. Id. at 1303-04.

7. 680 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012).
8. Id. at 1317-18.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
10. Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1318.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 1321.
13. 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
14. See Corbin & Duvafl, supra note 1, at 1205-06.

15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
16. Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1320.
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discriminatory intent."17 Even without evidence of a comparator, the
court held that the plaintiff had done exactly that. 8 Pointing to
evidence that the school had been "more concerned about her pregnancy
and her request to take maternity leave than about her admission that
she had premarital sex," the court of appeals reversed and remanded the
case for further proceedings.' 9
A similar fate befell the district court's decision in Chapter 7 Trustee
v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.2" The plaintiff worked as a customer service
representative at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.
She drove a truck for the defendant's catering business, and would drive
the truck from the company's warehouse to the airport gate where a
waiting airplane was docked. Using a lift system, she would push carts
of food, drinks, and ovens across a ramp from her truck to the airplane.
When the plaintiff became pregnant and developed medical restrictions
(no lifting over twenty pounds, no prolonged standing, no working at
heights that increased the chance of falling), she was terminated because
the company allegedly had no available positions to accommodate the
plaintiff's restrictions. In the plaintiff's resulting pregnancy discrimination action pursuant to Title VII, the district court granted summary
judgment for the employer because the plaintiff could not identify a
similarly situated individual outside of the protected class who was
treated differently.2
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit, again relying upon its LockheedMartin decision, reversed.22 Noting that under Lockheed-Martin, the
lack of a comparator does not "necessarily doom" the plaintiff's case, the
court of appeals held that there was enough "non-comparator evidence
for a jury to reasonably infer that" the plaintiff had been discriminated
against. 23 For starters, the plaintiff's supervisor had made his termination decision without even checking with his superiors as to whether
there was an available light duty position that the plaintiff could have
performed with her restrictions (despite the fact that it was company
The court also pointed to an admission that the
policy to do so).'
company's human resources director had made at her deposition that the
plaintiff's pregnancy had been a "substantial or motivating factor" in the

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. (quoting Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1328).
Id.
Id. at 1320-21.
683 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1251-52, 1254.
Id. at 1255-56, 1261.
Id. at 1255-56 (quoting Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1328).
Id. at 1256.

894

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

supervisor's decision to terminate her.25 In the face of this evidence,
the court of appeals vacated the summary judgment and remanded the
case for further proceedings.26
2. Cat's Paw Theory.
The decision in Lockheed-Martin and the
Supreme Court's "cat's paw" case in Staub v. Procter Hospital2 7 saved
the plaintiff's case in King v. Volunteers of America, North Alabama,
Inc.28 The plaintiff worked as a service coordinator for Volunteers of
America (VOA), a Christian organization that operated group homes for
developmentally challenged individuals. The plaintiff's supervisor,
according to the evidence, was an individual who frequently made racial
comments (including the "n" word), displayed favoritism toward
Caucasian employees, forced African-American employees to file false
reports of misconduct against other African-American employees, and
believed African-American employees were inferior. The supervisor also
made it known that he would engineer the plaintiff's termination and
that the defendant's CEO would "rubber stamp" any action that he took.
A sequence of reprimands by the supervisor led to the plaintiff's
termination by the CEO. 9 In the subsequent lawsuit by the plaintiff
pursuant to Title VII and Section 198130 alleging race discrimination
and retaliation, the district court granted summary judgment for
31
VOA.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the plaintiff could not
establish her case either through direct evidence or through the
traditional McDonnell Douglas approach (there was no evidence of a
relevant comparator or that the plaintiff was replaced by a Caucasian
employee).32 However, citing Lockheed-Martin, the court of appeals
noted that this was not fatal to her claims.3 3 The court then held that,
under Staub, there was sufficient evidence (particularly the evidence
that the supervisor would engineer the plaintiff's termination and that
the CEO would rubber-stamp anything he did) showing the CEO was the

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1261.
131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
502 F. App'x 823 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 824-26.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
King, 502 F. App'x at 826.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 827-28.
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supervisor's cat's paw in carrying out the plaintiff's termination.3
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. 5
The result in the above three cases raises the question, at least within
the Eleventh Circuit, of the long-term continued vitality of the circumstantial evidence model of proof first established in McDonnell Douglas
v. Green,36 which has governed disparate treatment employment
discrimination cases for forty years. Through a somewhat mechanical
application of the elements in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
model of proof, the courts have resolved countless employment discrimination cases for many, many years (and more often than not in favor of
the employer). The Lockheed-Martin approach, on the other hand, is a
much more flexible, case-by-case approach to employment discrimination
cases. It clearly will result in fewer summary judgments (and hence
more settlements, which may well be what the court has in mind by
taking this approach), and in this sense, will clearly benefit plaintiffs.
3. Religious Discrimination. In Walden v. Centers for Disease
Control & Prevention,37 the plaintiff worked as an Employee Assistance
Program (EAP) Counselor for Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC),
which administered the EAP pursuant to a contract with the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The plaintiff was a "devout
Christian" who believed that same-sex sexual relationships were
"immoral."31 When confronted with a gay client involved in a same-sex
relationship, the plaintiff referred the client to a colleague, explaining
that she could not provide counseling because of her "personal values." 9 The client complained to the CDC, saying she felt "judged and
condemned. '
When the plaintiff would not alter her approach, she
was removed from the EAP contract, and after she failed to apply for
another position with CSC, she was laid off.41 The plaintiff brought
suit against both the CDC and CSC alleging that the defendants violated
her free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 199342 (RFRA); and also alleging religious

34.
35.
36.
(1981).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 828.
Id. at 830.
411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
669 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1280 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1280-81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1281 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1282.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006).
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discrimination pursuant to Title VIL'
The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants on all claims."
On appeal, much of the court's decision addressed the First Amendment and RFRA claims.45 As to the Title VII religious discrimination
claim against CSC, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant had
provided the plaintiff "with a reasonable accommodation as a matter of
law."
After removing the plaintiff from the EAP contract, CSC had
offered her the opportunity to seek another position within the company
and had offered to provide assistance in doing so. The plaintiff declined
to do so. Finding that CSC had done all it was required to do under
Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.47
4. Hostile Work Environment. Guthrie v. Waffle House, Inc. 41 is
a good example of just how difficult it is to establish a hostile work
environment claim in the Eleventh Circuit. The plaintiff, a Caucasian
female, worked as a waitress at a Waffle House restaurant. She alleged
that two African-American male co-workers, one a cook and the other
her supervisor, sexually harassed her in the workplace. 49
They
allegedly "grabbed [her] butt" several times, "talked dirty" to her several
other times, asked her out on a date a number of times, told her that
they wanted to "have [her]," and made other similar offensive statements.5 ° There was also evidence that the plaintiff and the cook would
hug in a friendly manner and would occasionally joke around with each
other.5' The plaintiff filed suit pursuant to Title VII, alleging racial
and sexual harassment. The district court granted summary judgment
for Waffle House.52
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit, relying heavily on its prior decision
in Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.,5 affirmed.54 The court of appeals agreed
that the plaintiff had failed to show harassment that was either
objectively or subjectively severe or pervasive enough to establish a

43. Walden, 669 F.3d at 1283.

44. Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1285-92.
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1294-95.
460 F. App'x 803 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 804.
Id. at 804-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 805.
Id.
195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Guthrie, 460 F. App'x at 806-09.
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hostile work environment claim.55 In addition to the evidence that the
plaintiff had joked with and hugged the cook, the court of appeals also
noted that the plaintiff had waited almost a year after the alleged
harassment began before reporting it to the company's complaint
hotline.56
5. Retaliation. In a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit,
in Gowski v. Peake,57 joined the other eleven circuits in recognizing a
retaliatory hostile work environment claim.58 The plaintiffs were
employed as doctors for a VA hospital in Bay River, Florida. The
plaintiffs alleged that they had been retaliated against by the hospital
in various ways (changing their duty assignments, removing them from
committees, denying them privileges, reprimanding them, and the like)
after they had filed internal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
complaints. 59 The plaintiffs also presented evidence that the hospital
"did not look highly on employees who filed EEO complaints" and carried
out a concerted plan to target them, spread rumors about them,
attempted to ruin their reputations, and collected reports against them
in an effort to terminate them.6" In the plaintiffs' resulting Title VII
action, following a two-week jury trial, the jury ruled for both plaintiffs
and awarded substantial damages. 6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had to decide first whether it
recognized a cause of action for retaliatory hostile work environment,
and if so, whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
verdict." As noted above, the court had little difficulty in answering
the first question "yes," holding that recognizing this cause of action was
"consistent with the statutory text, congressional intent, and the EEOC's
own interpretation of the statute.6 3 The court of appeals also answered the second question with a "yes," finding that the evidence had
established that the defendants had "created a workplace filled with
intimidation and ridicule that was sufficiently severe and pervasive to
alter [the plaintiffs'] working conditions."64

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 806.
Id.
682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1313-14.
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In Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp.65 the Eleventh Circuit, through the
application of the so-called "manager rule," held that a manager who
voiced her disagreement with the way her company handled an internal
sexual harassment investigation was not engaged in protected activity
for purposes of Title VII's retaliation provision.6" The plaintiff was
tasked with conducting an investigation into a complaint that an
employee was being sexually harassed by her supervisor. During the
course of the investigation, the employee disclosed that she had been
raped numerous times by the supervisor, but asked that neither her
husband nor the police be told of the rapes. Even though the supervisor
was fired, the plaintiff maintained that the matter should be reported
to the police, but the employer honored the employee's wishes and
declined. The plaintiff's continued insistence that the police be contacted
eventually resulted in her own termination. After the plaintiff filed a
retaliation action pursuant to Title VII, the district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant.67 On appeal, in affirming the
district court pursuant to the manager rule, the Eleventh Circuit held
that a manager who disagrees with or opposes the actions of his
employer while "in the course of [his] normal job performance," is not
engaged in protected activity.6"
B.

ProceduralIssues

1. Jurisdiction. The appropriate forum for a federal employee to
obtain judicial review of a discrimination claim was the issue before the
United States Supreme Court in Kloeckner v. Solis.69 The plaintiff
worked for the Department of Labor (DOL). After DOL terminated her
employment, the plaintiff filed a complaint of sex and age discrimination
with DOL's civil rights office. Ultimately, the plaintiff appealed her
termination to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB). The MSPB
dismissed her appeal on procedural grounds without reaching the merits
of the plaintiff's discrimination claim. The plaintiff then filed a
discrimination action against DOL in federal district court, which
dismissed the case, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 70 However, the
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the plaintiff had selected the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

466 F. App'x 781 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 787-88.
Id. at 783-85.
Id. at 787.
133 S. Ct. 596 (2012).
Id. at 602-03.
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proper forum after all.71 Although noting that in most cases, judicial
review of an MSPB decision should be brought before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court held that
an exception to this rule covered discrimination claims, which, as
specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7702(aXl), 72 can be asserted in district court.73
2. Waiver of Time Limit on Filing Complaint. It is unusual for
a pro-se plaintiff to make it as far as a jury trial, much less the court of
appeals, but that is exactly what happened in Ramirez v. Secretary.74
The plaintiff worked as an air traffic controller for the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT). Following a dispute with the DOT over his
rate of pay, the plaintiff contacted an EEO Counselor and complained
that he was being discriminated against because he was Hispanic. The
DOT dismissed his complaint because he had not contacted the EEO
Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discriminatory act as
specified in the discrimination regulations governing federal agencies.75
The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the EEOC, who found that the
plaintiff's complaint should have been treated as timely, since there was
no evidence that the plaintiff was aware of the forty-five-day time limit.
The DOT did not challenge the timeliness ruling. In the plaintiff's
subsequent Title VII action, the district court dismissed the case as timebarred, relying on the forty-five-day rule.76 However, on appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, following similar decisions handed down by
7
the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second and Ninth Circuits,
and held that since the DOT had never challenged the EEOC's ruling
that the plaintiff's complaint had been timely, the agency was held to
have waived any subsequent objection on timeliness grounds in the
district court.78
C.

Remedies

1.
Taxation of Settlements. The issue of how employment
discrimination settlements are to be treated for taxation purposes is
often a thorny problem. That certainly proved to be the case in Ahmed

71,
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 603-04.
5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1) (2006).
Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 603-04.
686 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1244-46; see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (2012).
Ramirez, 686 F.3d at 1250-51.
See Briones v. Runyon, 101 F.3d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1996); Girard v. Rubin, 62 F.3d

1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1995).

78. Ramirez, 686 F.3d at 1253.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

900

[Vol. 64

79 The plaintiff brought a discrimination lawsuit
v. Commissioner.
pursuant to both Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), 0 in which he sought back pay and benefits, and compensatory and punitive damages. 8 The plaintiff settled the case for
$150,000, of which $60,000 (or forty percent) was designated as attorney
fees. 2 As to the plaintiff's portion totaling $90,000, the plaintiff opted
to exclude the entire amount from his taxable income, taking the
position that the settlement amount constituted compensation for
physical injury and, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2),3 was not
taxable." The Tax Court disagreed, and held that the entire settlement amount was taxable income. 5 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
agreed, and affirmed the Tax Court's decision."6 In reaching this
decision, the court of appeals looked to the plaintiff's original discrimination complaint, which, according to the court, "'placed little emphasis' on
his physical injuries," as well as the language of the settlement
agreement, which did not specifically designate any portion of the
settlement as compensation for physical injury 7

2. Back Pay. In Holland v. Gee,8" the Eleventh Circuit examined
the district court's action in vacating a back pay award pursuant to the
after-acquired evidence defense.8 9 In the process, the court of appeals
determined that the district court misapplied the doctrine.9" The
plaintiff brought a pregnancy discrimination action against the
defendant county sheriff. Following a jury trial, the jury awarded the
plaintiff $80,000 in back pay and $10,000 for emotional distress. In
post-trial motions, the district court vacated the back pay award,
applying the after-acquired evidence defense. 9 ' On appeal, however,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that the defendant had never raised the
after-acquired evidence defense in its answer as an affirmative
defense.92 In addition, at oral argument, the defendant conceded that

79. 498 F. App'x 919 (11th Cir. 2012).
80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
81. Ahmed, 498 F. App'x at 920.

82. Id.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
Ahmed, 498 F. App'x at 920.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 922-23.
Id. at 921.
677 F.3d 1047 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1064.
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he could point to no specific act of misconduct that the plaintiff had
committed, only that there was evidence presented that could have
resulted in a finding that the plaintiff's termination had been lawful.9 3
Holding that the after-acquired evidence defense could only be applied
where there was proof that the plaintiff had committed a specific act of
"wrongdoing [that] was of such severity that the employee in fact would
have been terminated on those 'grounds alone," the court of appeals
concluded the district court had erred in vacating the back pay award. 94
II.
A.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Creating a Jury Question

In Kragor v. Takeda PharmaceuticalsAmerica, Inc., the court of
appeals reversed and remanded a district court's grant of summary
judgment for an employer.96 The plaintiff, a pharmaceutical sales
manager, had been fired for committing a serious offense. 97 The
decisionmaker who fired her subsequently contradicted his earlier
statement that she had committed a firing offense.9" The court noted,
When the employer's actual decisionmaker, after terminating an
employee for misconduct (or the appearance of misconduct), says
without qualification that the employee is exceptional, did nothing
wrong, did everything right, and should not have been fired, that
contradiction-when combined with a prima facie case-is enough to
create a jury question on the ultimate issue of discrimination. 9
An investigation had determined the plaintiff had provided improper
gifts and benefits to one of her employer's major clients-a doctor. The
employer also determined that the plaintiff had improperly approved
reimbursements for subordinate employees' expenses. Orlando was a
member of the employer's senior management team that fired Kragor as
a result of the investigation.' 0 The doctor claimed that Orlando later
told him the plaintiff was an exceptional employee who "had done

93. Id. at 1060.
94. Id. at 1065 (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352,362-

63 (1995)).
95.
96.
97.
Takeda
98.
99.
100.

702 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1307. The pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated. Consequently,
had strict conduct policies for its employees. Id.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1307-10.
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nothing wrong" and "should not have been fired."'' The panel held
that a reasonable jury could find Orlando's alleged statement contradicting his earlier reasons for firing the plaintiff
was evidence of pretext,
12
possibly to cover up age discrimination. 0
The district court had granted summary judgment on the grounds that
Orlando's "personal belief regarding plaintiffs conduct" should be
detached from the company's asserted reasons for discharge. 1 3
"Orlando's denial of Takeda's proffered reason for Ms. Kragor's
termination-which we accept as true for purposes of summary
judgment-creates a jury question as to discrimination when combined
with Ms. Kragor's prima facie case," the court of appeals said.' 0 ' "We
therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Takeda and remand for a trial on Ms. Kragor's claim that her
termination was the result of age discrimination in violation of the
ADEA." 10 5 The panel reasoned that the district court's characterization of Orlando's comments to the doctor is a reasonable one, "but it is
not the only permissible construction of the remarks."0 6 The panel
ruled that it was also reasonable to interpret the statements as
Orlando's admission that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason was
actually a cover-up for age discrimination.' 7
B. Application of Gross at the Summary Judgment Stage
Vahey v. Philips Electronics North America Corp.' presented the
court of appeals with an opportunity to discuss the impact of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,i°9
on the continued vitality of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework in ADEA cases. 110 The panel took the middle course.
"Because the Supreme Court did not overrule this precedent in Gross, we
review Vahey's claims under both McDonnell Douglas and Gross.""

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1311.
Id.
Id.
Id.
461 F. App'x 873 (11th Cir. 2012).
557 U.S. 167 (2009).

110. As mentioned earlier in this Article, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework has been an analytical mainstay in employment law. When the Supreme Court
decided Gross in 2009, questions quickly arose about whether McDonnell Douglas
continued to be a proper analytic tool in ADEA cases.
111. Vahey, 461 F. App'x at 874.
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In light of the decision and analysis in Vahey, ADEA plaintiffs must now
survive both the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis and the
Gross but-for requirement in order to survive summary judgment.
C. Evidence of Animus
In Diehl v. Bank of America, N.A.,11 a reduction-in-force case, a
supervisor referred to the plaintiff as "our old-timer."113 The plaintiff
argued in the district court that this statement was evidence of an age
animus."" Granting summary judgment for the employer, the district
court concluded, "this statement was made in the context of comparing
years of services between employees," and it had been made after the
decision that ultimately led to the plaintiffs discharge of employment.115 The court of appeals agreed." 6 Given the context in which
the statement was made, it was not evidence of a discriminatory
animus.117

In another reduction-in-force case, Proe v. Facts Services, Inc.,"' the
court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the
employer where the employer simply considered the retained employee
to be a "better fit" than plaintiff." 9
D. Interest Calculation
Mock v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.'20 made what should be its final
trip to court of appeals during the survey period. We have reported on
various aspects of Mock in previous survey articles. 2 ' After three
years of "contentious litigation," on the merits, the plaintiff prevailed in
a lawsuit against Bell Helicopter and was awarded substantial economic
damages.'22 Nearly three more years of litigation followed on the
collateral issues of attorney fees and costs. The district court ultimately
awarded the plaintiff less than one half of the fees he sought. The
plaintiff appealed.'23

112. 470 F. App'x 771 (11th Cir. 2012).
113. Id. at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. at 774-75.
115. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 775.
117. Id.
118. 491 F. App'x 135 (11th Cir. 2012).
119. Id. at 137-38.
120. 456 F. App'x 799 (11th Cir. 2012).
121. See Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1125, 1139 (2011).
122. Mock, 456 F. App'x at 801.
123. Id.
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While the court of appeals affirmed the fee award, it concluded that
the district court had clearly erred by failing to award interest on costs
and fees from the date of entry of the final judgment. 2 4 "And, though
we have not specifically addressed the issue of when interest begins to
accrue on an award of attorneys' fees under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), we find
clear guidance in this Court's precedent." 125 The panel determined
that awarding interest from the date of the final judgment on the merits
is the proper approach and remanded the26 case for recalculation of the
interest due on the attorney fees award.
III.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

A.

The MinisterialExemption
The Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-TaborEvangelicalLutheran
Church & School v.EEOC12v concerned application of the ministerial
exemption to an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)128 retaliatory
firing dispute. The Court unanimously concluded that the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise clauses create a broad
"ministerial exemption" that bar a discriminatory termination lawsuit
against a religious organization
by a school teacher who is also a
12 9
commissioned minister.

The High Court reversed the decision the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which had overturned a district court's
grant of summary judgment to the employer. 3 ° The district court had
concluded that the ministerial exemption precluded the suit. The Sixth
Circuit vacated and remanded, determining that the individual at issue
did not qualify 3as a minister under prior interpretations of the ministerial exemption.' '
In its decision, the Supreme Court substantially expanded the scope
of the exemption. 3 2 In light of the historical background against
which the First Amendment came into being, the Supreme Court held
that that Establishment Clause prevents the government from appointing ministers, while the Free Exercise Clause bars it from interfering

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 803-04.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 803-04.
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
Hosanna-Tabor,132 S.Ct. at 709-10.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 706.
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133
with religious organizations' freedom to pick their own ministers.
The two religious clauses provide the roots for a restated ministerial
exemption, which keeps government
from "intrud[ing] upon more than
1 4
a mere employment decision."

By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its
own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state
the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful
also violates the Establishment Clause, which
prohibits government
13 5
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
This appears to be the first case in which the Court has used the
principle of separation to protect the anatomy of religious life.
B.

Safe Harbor

Seff v.Broward County136 presented the court of appeals with an
opportunity to discuss the safe harbor provisions of the ADA. 3 ' At
issue was whether Broward County's employee wellness program fell
within the safe harbor provision for insurance plans. The court of
appeals concluded that the wellness program was a term of the county's
insurance and therefore fell within the safe harbor.3 8 The named
plaintiff originally brought suit seeking to represent a class of current
and former Broward County employees who enrolled in the County's
health insurance plan and incurred a twenty-dollar biweekly fee for
declining to submit to biometric screening and a health risk assessment
as part of its worker wellness program. Seff maintained that the
screening and risk assessment violated the ADA prohibitions on nonvoluntary medical examinations and disability-related inquiries. 3 9
The panel concluded there is no requirement that an employee
wellness program be explicitly identified in a benefit plan's written

133. Id.
134. Id. at 697.
135. Id.
136. 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) exempts certain insurance plans from the ADA's general
prohibitions. Seff, 691 F.3d at 1223.
The safe harbor provision states that the ADA "shall not be construed" as
prohibiting a covered entity "from establishing, sponsoring, observing or
administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting
risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not
inconsistent with State law."
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2).
138. Seff, 691 F.3d at 1224.
139. Id. at 1222.
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documents to qualify it as "term" of the benefit plan within the meaning
of ADA safe harbor provision.14 The panel concluded that the records
made clear the County's insurer sponsored the wellness program as part
of its contract to give the County a group health plan, the plan was only
available to group plan enrollees, and the County advertised the
program as part of its broader plan in at least two employee handouts.' 4 ' "In light of these facts, the district court did not err in finding
as a matter of law that the employee wellness program was a 'term' of
Broward's group health insurance plan, such that the
employee wellness
4
plan fell within the ADA's safe harbor provision." 1
IV.

SECTION 1981

In Jones v. UPS Ground Freight,' a panel of the court of appeals
concluded that banana peels can be evidence of racial harassment.'"
Building on its history of concluding that facially neutral terms may
take on racial connotations in certain contexts, 45 the panel vacated the
grant of summary judgment for an employer.'
The district court had
concluded that the plaintiff's claimed maltreatment was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. The district
court also concluded there is nothing inherently racist about a banana,
4
absent direct supporting evidence. 1
The appeals panel, however, had no difficulty concluding that such
evidence created a jury question. 1' Quoting language used by other
courts of appeals, the panel stated: "[I]t has become easier to coat
various forms of discrimination with the appearance of propriety because
the threat
of liability takes that which was once overt and makes it
" 149
subtle.
The plaintiff claimed that he had complained to his employer on
several occasions that he found banana pieces or peels on his truck after
he left it parked at the employer's trucking terminal. The plaintiff
testified that he found bananas on his truck on multiple occasions, they

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id.
683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1298.

145. See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883,901 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that
use of the term "boy" could have racial connotation).
146. Jones, 683 F.3d at 1304.

147. Id. at 1291.
148. Id. at 1303-04.
149. Id. at 1297 (quoting Ellis v. CCA of Tenn., LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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were always in just one or two places on the truck even though he
parked it in a different location each night, and there was no evidence
bananas were found on any other truck or that the plaintiff had ever
found any other trash on his truck.15
The panel concluded the
plaintiff's version of events suggests that the bananas were not
appearing on his truck by mere chance.' 51
V. SECTION 1983
In Underwood v. Harkins,'52 a divided panel concluded that a
Georgia superior court clerk did not violate the First Amendment 5 3
when she dismissed a deputy clerk who had run against her in the
election. 5 4 The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary
judgment to the election winner. 5 The court reasoned that when an
elected official's immediate subordinate has the same duties and powers
as the official under state or local law, the official does not violate the
First Amendment by terminating the subordinate for opposing the
official in an election. 5 ' The clerk had admitted she had fired the
plaintiff based on her earlier candidacy. She maintained that her need
for workplace confidentiality and loyalty outweighed the plaintiff's First
Amendment interest in her candidacy.'5 7 The dissent in the decision
argued that the question of whether a public employee holds a job from
which she can be lawfully dismissed due to a state interest in political
loyalty is a factual question, not a question of law. 158
VI. SECTION 1985
A failed Section 1985' claim is worthy of mention because it arose
out of the Mohawk Industries illegal workers litigation. 6 ° In Carpen-

150. Id. at 1298.
151. Id. at 1298-99.
152. 698 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
154. Underwood, 698 F.3d at 1345-46.
155. Id. at 1346.
156. Id. at 1343.
157. Id. at 1338, 1340.
158. Id. at 1346 (Martin, J., dissenting).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2006).
160. A civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act suit was filed in 2004
against Mohawk Industries by current and former employees. Carpenter v. Mohawk
Indus., 479 F. App'x 206, 207 (11th Cir. 2012). It is known as the Williams suit. Id. The
suit alleged a conspiracy between Mohawk and several temporary employment agencies
to keep wages low through the use of illegal aliens as temporary workers. See Williams
v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc.,

908

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

ter v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 1 ' the plaintiff alleged that Mohawk's
lawyers and human resource personnel conspired to deter him from
testifying in the Williams litigation. To prevail on a deterrence based
claim under Section 1985(2), a plaintiff must show the elements of a
conspiracy."' The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Mohawk. 6 ' The court of appeals affirmed."& "For one thing, the
evidence is insufficient to establish the second required element: that
any force, intimidation, or threat was made by Mohawk in an effort to
deter Plaintiff's involvement in the Williams case."'65 In fact, the
panel concluded that the plaintiffs reasoning was flawed:
One cannot reasonably infer that, simply by making false allegations
against Plaintiff and by firing Plaintiff from his job-before he was to
testify-Defendants had entered into a conspiracy to deter (that is, to
discourage or to frighten) him from testifying. It is not to be expected
that a group of conspirators would act to deter someone from testifying
by just cutting off, in advance of his planned testimony, the most
significant source of influence that the conspirators have over that
person: his job. Firing someone from their job, amid false allegations
of wrongdoing, seems as though it, by itself, would likely create
animosity towards a former employer, thereby encouraging-not
deterring-that fired employee's testimony against the company. 66

465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006).
161. 479 F. App'x 206 (11th Cir. 2012).
162. Id. at 209.
163. Id. at 208.
164. Id. at 210.
165. Id. at 209.
166. Id. (quoting Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 289 F.3d 1268, 1271-72
(11th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 298 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

